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WHAT'S IN A NAME OR, BETTER YET,
WHAT'S IT WORTH? CITIES, SPORTS
TEAMS AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Mitchell Nathansont
ABSTRACT
This article examines the harm that accompanies real and
threatened in-market relocations of professional sports teams and
proposes a federal statutory remedy that will protect the interest of
city residents given the reality that city governments have
demonstrated their inability to adequately protect their electorate
through contract law alone. Although, as this article discusses, there
have been myriad bills proposed by Congress in response to several
high profile out-of-market sports franchise relocations (mostly those
involving NFL teams and mostly during the 1990's), in-market
relocations have historically occurred much more frequently,
inflicting similar harms to the spumed city residents. Moreover, as
this article shows, these harms accrue even when these franchises
ultimately decide to remain within the boundaries of their urban
bases; it is the mere threat and resulting relocation negotiations pitting
city against nearby suburb, each hoping to curry the local team's
favor, that cause damage. As in-market relocations are likely to
become even more prevalent in the future, this article contends that
legislation is needed. This article concludes that amending the federal
Lanham Act by providing cities with a limited property right-a right
of publicity-in their names will cure many of these ills. By so doing,
the true costs of in-market relocations will be felt by teams that, as of
now, are free to relocate at their whim, taking advantage of superior
t Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law.
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lease terms offered by suburban political entities while at the same
time benefiting from the affiliation with the cities they have spumed.
A federally created right of publicity would prevent such actions or,
at a minimum, compel sports franchises to pay for the right to
associate with a city in which it no longer plays if it wishes to reap the
attendant benefits of the association.
INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 2006, in a scene repeated dozens of times across
the United States over the past several decades, the NFL's San
Francisco 49'ers announced that because they were unable to come to
terms with the city in which they played for the construction of a new
stadium, they had no choice but to relocate.1 Having spurned San
Francisco, their home since 1946, they now set their sights upon
Santa Clara, a logical choice given that the team's headquarters and
practice facility had been located there since 1987. Although Santa
Clara is approximately 45 miles and, depending upon the fickle Bay
Area traffic, at least an hour's drive from San Francisco, the 49'ers
likewise announced on that date that they intended to keep the San
Francisco name.2 This too was not unusual as several teams in all four
major professional sports leagues (Major League Baseball, the
National Football League, the National Basketball Association and
the National Hockey League) play their home games in geographical
locations other than the ones emblazoned on their uniforms: the
NFL's Dallas Cowboys play in Irving, Texas; MLB's Tampa Bay
Devil Rays in St. Petersburg, Florida; the NBA's Detroit Pistons in
Auburn Hills, Michigan; and the NHL's Phoenix Coyotes in
Glendale, Arizona, to name but a few. What was unusual was the
reaction of the city of San Francisco to this announcement: it strongly
objected to the continuation of this practice as far as the 49'ers were
concerned.3 Across the San Francisco bay, baseball's Oakland A's
were in the midst of a similar relocation: they too were abandoning
I Dennis Georgatos, 49 "ers Tell S.F. They're Leaving, Team Ends Stadium Talks, Plans
to Pursue Site in Santa Clara Instead, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at F4.
2 1d; Cecilia M. Vega, 49"ers Insist They'll Keep 'San Francisco' City, S. F. CHRON.,
Nov. 14, 2006, at A14. (Said Lisa Lang, team spokeswoman: "We absolutely remain committed
to the San Francisco 49ers name. We will not change our name.... It's the San Francisco Bay
Area. We've been the San Francisco 49ers for 60 years, and if you look at other examples it's
very common now for teams to be outside of their namesake.").
3 See Vega, supra note 2; Jim Sanders, Balking Over Team's Name: S.F. Assemblyman to
Propose Law Barring 49'ers from Using 'San Francisco' if they Move, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 11, 2006, at A3. California Senator Diane Feinstein has also intimated that she would fight
to prevent the 49'ers from transporting the "San Francisco" name to Santa Clara. See Edward
Epstein, et al, Feinstein Bids to Keep Names from Ball Club, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 2006, at
B4.
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the city and stadium they called home for decades and were adamant
upon relocating to Fremont, a 27 mile, half-hour drive away.4 And
like the 49'ers, the A's too intended on keeping their Oakland
affiliation.
Four hundred miles to the south, in Anaheim, a somewhat different
but fundamentally similar battle between city and team over the
geographical designation of a sports team's name had recently
concluded with the city of Anaheim ultimately unable to prevent
Anaheim Angels' owner Arturo Moreno from rechristening his
Anaheim Angels baseball team the Los Angeles Angels of
Anaheim-a mouthful, to say the least.5 The Anaheim legal battle,
discussed in detail below, foretells the future of the San Francisco and
Oakland scrums should either city decide to press its demand to
prevent the relocating 49'ers and A's from using, respectively, the
San Francisco and Oakland, geographical identifiers without the
cities' permission. For as the law currently stands, "[p]retty [sic]
much whatever a team wants to call itself, it can.",6 Without a change
in the law, San Francisco is powerless to stop the 49'ers, or anyone
else for that matter, from using San Francisco's name, for the team's
benefit, without the city's permission. Thus, as it presently stands, the
cities of Oakland, San Francisco and Anaheim, as well as Los
Angeles, which likewise had its name appropriated in the Angels
litigation, are without a remedy. Their names are free and available to
any professional sports team seeking to profit from the association
with the market and image they represent. This article asks whether
this represents unjust enrichment and whether Congress should step in
and protect what may very well be a property right that has gone, up
to now, unprotected: the limited right of a city to its name.
This article analyzes the motivations behind in-market moves by
professional sports teams, such as the ones contemplated by the
49'ers and A's, and shows that, contrary to popular assumption, such
moves are not benign; in fact they involve harm to any city at the
mercy of the sports team contemplating such a relocation. In-market
relocations, regardless of whether they are consummated or merely
threatened, invariably result in the very same improper benefits to
sports franchises that are decried whenever a team moves out-of-
market for the greener pastures (and below-market rents and above-
4 See Patrick Hoge, A's Sign Contracts for Land in Fremont to Build New Stadium, S. F.
CHRON., May 11, 2007, at BI.
5 See City of Anaheim v. Superior Ct., No. G035159, 2005 WL 1523338 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 27, 2005).
6 Vega, supra note 2, at A14 (quoting Matt Mitten, director of Marquette University's
National Sports Law Institute).
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market benefits) of a far away city. Due to changing demographics
and economic developments in professional sports, in-market
relocations are likely to become only more common in the future as
they represent to many teams their best option in their eternal quest to
maximize revenue by squeezing as much money from public sources
as possible; such harm may need to be addressed and remedied. This
article examines the playing field, so to speak, upon which the
negotiations between professional sports team and city (or political
subdivision) take place and concludes that, because cities do not own
the rights to the use of their names, the field is invariably and
improperly tilted in favor of the teams, with the result being corporate
welfare far and above what cities would have had to concede if only
the field were level. Accordingly, Congress may have an interest in
stepping in and remedying the imbalance. As for the nature of this
remedy, this article proposes an exception to the Lanham Act that
would grant cities a limited quasi-property right-a right of
publicity-not unlike the right Congress created in its 1999
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") 7 wherein it
granted individuals, in effect, similar rights within the limited context
of registered Internet domain names. As the granting of this similarly
limited and circumscribed right would have the effect of equalizing
the bargaining power of cities and the professional sports franchises
seeking to profit off of the use of their names, it would pave the way
for stadium leases between city and team that more accurately reflect
and represent the interests of both parties.
I. THE RE-CHRISTENING OF THE LOS ANGELES ANGELS OF ANAHEIM
In 1996, the Anaheim Angels were bought by the Walt Disney
Company, which likewise operated Disneyland within the city limits
of Anaheim. 8 At the time of the purchase, the city of Anaheim entered
into a lease with Disney for the use of Anaheim's stadium. Pursuant
to the lease, the city agreed to fund $30 million of the approximately
$100 million cost of renovating the aging stadium in exchange for a
lease provision that stipulated that the Angels keep the Anaheim
designation for the duration of the contract.9 In 2003, however,
Disney sold the Angels to Moreno for approximately $180 million.' 0
With such a significant investment in the team, Moreno sought to
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)-(d), 1129(2000).
8 See City ofAnaheim, 2005 WL 1523338, at *1.
9 Id.
10 Laura M. Holson, Disney Reaches a Deal For the Sale of the Angels, N. Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2003, at S3.
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maximize his return. Very quickly, he realized the financial
significance of the geographical identification of his team and
recognized that some identities were more valuable than others. In his
case, he had purchased a Major League Baseball team with the
unfortunate geographic designation of Anaheim. If only his Angels
were identified with Los Angeles instead, they would be worth so
much more. For proof of this assertion, Moreno had to look no further
than his local television contract. Even though the Angels were the
2002 World Series Champions while the Dodgers had not even
played in a World Series since 1988, even though both teams
recorded identical viewership shares, and even though both teams had
maintained a Southern California presence for nearly half a century
(the Dodgers arrived in 1958; the Angels a mere three years later in
1961), the best television deal the Angels could wring from local
station KCAL was one worth $5.5 million; the Dodgers received a
$10 million deal from the same station.' Clearly, the Los Angeles
designation was more valuable than the Anaheim one.
Given this reality, Moreno promptly ignored the contract his
predecessors signed with Anaheim and rechristened his team the Los
Angeles Angels of Anaheim, hoping to benefit from the association
with the larger Los Angeles market.1 2 Although the city of Anaheim
protested, sued and sought a preliminary injunction forbidding the
name change, alleging that the change caused irreparable harm to the
city by relegating it to second-class status and damaging local pride,
Moreno prevailed despite a contract that seemingly protected
Anaheim's interests.' 3 By the close of the 2005 baseball season, the
name change became permanent. In the end, Anaheim was powerless
to protect and control the use of its name. Although not a party to the
suit, the city of Los Angeles likewise was given no say in the use of
its name for the financial benefit of Moreno and his Angels. There is
no indication that its interest in the litigation was even considered.
Aware of the reality demonstrated in the Angels litigation but
nevertheless realizing that it "feels a bit of a rip-off' for a team such
as the 49'ers to relocate but continue to reap the benefits of the San
Francisco name, a local assemblyman introduced a bill into the
California legislature that would make such a practice illegal unless
1 City ofAnaheim, 2005 WL 1523338, at *8.
12 Moreno argued that, technically, the name change complied with the lease negotiated
by his predecessor, Disney, given that the name "Anaheim" still appeared in the official team's
name, albeit at the end. In order to technically comply with the lease, however, a tongue-teaser
of a name would most likely result in most fans and news organizations cutting the "of
Anaheim" designation and simply referring to the former Anaheim Angels as the Los Angeles
Angels instead. See id. at *4, 11 n. 8.
13 See id. at *l1-2.
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the mayor and Board of Supervisors of the abandoned city authorized
such use.1 4 This came on the heels of Assembly Bill 1041, introduced
by an Anaheim assemblyman in response to the Angels litigation,
which would have required a team named for a city where it does not
play to disclose that fact on tickets and promotional material.15
Although both bills are noble in their aims, both are doomed in their
effect: because they conflict with federal trademark law, specifically,
the Lanham Act (professional sports team names are registered
trademarks owned by the team itself), 16 any proposed state law would
invariably be preempted by federal law and, as such, would be
destined for failure.
Although the specifics of the Angels litigation certainly were
unusual, the supposedly minor, benign, in-market relocation desires
of both the 49'ers and A's just as certainly are not. Relocation, or,
more accurately, threatened relocation, has been a way of life in
major professional sports for more than half a century. Between 1950
and 1998 there were 68 relocations in the four major sports-with the
vast majority of these being in-market relocations.' 7 Between 1990
and 2000, there were 77 major league facility lease re-negotiations,
modernizations or newly constructed stadiums in these sports.' 8 And
between 2000 and 2005, an additional 21 stadiums were built for
teams in these four leagues.' 9 The overwhelming majority of these
relocations, new stadiums and lease re-negotiations were the result of
in-market maneuvering in which a team, like the NFL's 49'ers or
MLB's A's, sought to improve its leverage by threatening relocation,
very often no further than across the nearest river or city limit. The
dynamics of such a scenario are amazingly simple and predictable:
inevitably, a bidding war between city and suburb ensues with the
team needing to do little more than sit back and fan the competitive
flames between its potential suitors. Eventually, a new deal is
consummated with the team either relocating across the city limit or
remaining within the city. Under either scenario, the new lease terms
14 Sanders, supra note 3.
15 Id. Although Assembly Bill 1041 passed the Assembly (52-17), it failed to pass in the
State Senate.
16 See Jennifer E. McGarry, A Team With No Name, A City With No Name: Trademark
Issues Relating To Sports Franchise Relocation, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 77-79
(1997) (noting that a similar bill introduced in Congress arguably is an unconstitutional taking).
17 Kerry M. Fraas, Comment, "Bankers Up!" Professional Sports Facility Financing and
Other Opportunities for Bank Involvement in Lucrative Professional Sports, 3 N. C. BANKING
INST. 201, 203 (1999).
Is Martin J. Greenburg, Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, 10
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 383 (2000).
19 Frank A. Meyer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where
We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195 (2005).
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are invariably one-sided, inuring solely to the benefit of the team and
at the expense of local taxpayers. Although, to date, commentators
and members of Congress have largely ignored these ever-increasing
political ballets, perhaps it is time they paid attention. The resulting
harms are very real and oftentimes devastating.
II. RELOCATION DESIRES AND RESPONSES
Traditionally, it has been the out-of-market relocation that has
drawn the attention of both Congress and commentators, although not
to the extent that anything much has been done about it. The costs and
benefits of such moves have been widely debated and although
several bills have been proposed to curb the practice, none have
garnered enough support to pass into law. The impetus for relocation
as well as the bills proposed in response to the flurry of out-of-market
relocations in the NFL in the mid 1990's are discussed below.
A. Why Teams Move
In each of the four major sports leagues, teams are granted
exclusive geographic territories in which to operate.20 In the NFL, for
example, eastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey and northern
Delaware mark the exclusive territory of the Philadelphia Eagles. The
Baltimore Ravens cannot encroach from the South, the Pittsburgh
Steelers cannot encroach from the West and the New York Giants and
Jets cannot encroach from the North, absent permission from the
NFL. In theory, this absence of competition should ensure that each
team thrives within its geographic region and would never seek to
relocate. In practice it has not worked out this way, for while teams
and their leagues do indeed benefit from geographic exclusivity, they
learned long ago that they can benefit even more by using it to their
advantage.21 The logic is simple: in order to maximize profit,
professional sports leagues must expand quickly enough to deter the
formation of rival leagues that would create a market and hence,
undercut profitability, but slowly enough to ensure that there remain
"viable, vacant locations to which existing teams could move. 22
20 Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations
From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League
Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57, 60 (1997).
21 See id. at 96-98 (noting that teams use geographic exclusivity to their advantage by
shopping the franchise around to multiple markets in the hopes of creating a bidding war).
22 John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their
Communities, 14 J. EcoN. PERSP. 95, 98 (2000); see also Daniel S. Mason & Trevor Slack,
Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice? Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the
Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 399, 412-13 (1997).
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According to at least some economists, two to four potential markets
appears to be the ideal number.23 The presence of these available
markets forces a team's home city to take relocation threats seriously
and results in the bidding war hoped-for by the team seeking to
improve its lease. In this game, the team cannot help but win: either it
relocates to the city offering the most lucrative deal (one that is far
and away superior to the team's present lease) or it remains and
benefits through either a renegotiated lease or a renovated or new
stadium, with either alternative a marked improvement over its
current deal. By engaging multiple cities in a competitive bidding
process for it, the team emerges victorious regardless.
Cities, by contrast, do not enjoy similar negotiating advantages.
Geographic exclusivity puts them at a disadvantage in that, by
definition, they are unable to negotiate with more than one team at a
time. Given the extremely limited uses of large sports facilities and
given the monopoly power of sports leagues to limit competition
within geographic regions, cities are left vulnerable at the bargaining
table, with no other recourse than to outbid potentially several other
cities by offering up sub-market rents and above-market perks if they
hope to retain their teams.2 4 In this way, "[a] sports franchise can
extract a monopoly price from a community by insisting on millions
of dollars of publicly financed subsidies, such as reduced rental fees,
playing facility or infrastructure improvements, or new arenas or
stadiums., 25 Given this reality, it is little wonder why teams seek to
relocate despite the apparent perks of geographic exclusivity.
A few recent examples illustrate the extent to which teams benefit
from their superior bargaining positions. In the NFL, the city of St.
Louis, which had been without a team ever since its Cardinals
relocated to Phoenix in 1988, was determined to outbid its rivals in
order to secure the Rams, who had made it clear that they were
unsatisfied with their lease arrangement in Anaheim. With several
cities vying for the franchise, St. Louis offered up the key to its city
and then some, promising to turn over to the team 75% of all
advertising revenue from its newly constructed domed stadium (paid
for, at a cost of $300 million, primarily with public funds), personal
seat license revenue of $74 million, luxury seat revenue, and $1.3
23 Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 22, at 49.
24 See id. at 98 (noting that sports leagues "have lured state and local government officials
into a frantic competition to build stadiums and arenas with tax or lottery revenues, requiring the
teams to pay virtually no rent, while retaining all or nearly all of the revenues"). See also Mitten
& Burton, supra note 20, at 60-61 (noting that cities are forced to publicly finance stadiums in
an effort to retain current teams and attract new ones).
25 Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 97-98.
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million per year in naming rights.26 In exchange, the city and state of
Missouri kept for themselves all of $250,000 per year in ticket sales
and $1 million per year in taxes based upon attendance.27 If all of this
were not enough, the city agreed to include in its lease an opt-out
clause which would allow the Rams to void the agreement and
relocate without penalty if the stadium was not ranked in the top 25%
of all NFL stadiums.28 Finally, when a snafu between the NFL and
Rams emerged over the league's insistence that the Rams pay a $29
million league-mandated relocation fee, the city agreed to pay $20
million of this.29 In all, by one estimate, as a result of this
arrangement the city and state receive no more than 10% each year of
what they spend on the stadium.3° Clearly, St. Louis's lack of
bargaining power contributed to this overwhelmingly one-sided
deal.3
The St. Louis deal is typical of the types of arrangements reached
between public entity and professional sports franchise due to the
inequality of bargaining power. In Baltimore, the city, seeking to
replace the NFL's Colts who relocated to Indianapolis years earlier,
agreed to fund 100% of a new, $200 million football stadium in order
to entice the Cleveland Browns to relocate.32 In addition, it offered
the team free rent as well as 100% of all luxury box, parking and
stadidm advertising revenue.33 Publicly funded stadiums, offered up
at little or no cost to teams, are a common carrot used to lure
opportunity-sniffing franchises. In 1990, the city of St. Petersburg,
Florida built a $138 million stadium in the hopes of luring either the
Chicago White Sox or San Francisco Giants to town.34 Neither team
took the bait, choosing instead to use the new stadium in St. Pete as a
chip in which to negotiate superior lease agreements with their home
towns instead. As a result, the cities of Chicago and San Francisco
soon helped to finance the construction of new homes for their teams.
The impetus for publicly funded stadiums was perhaps best
26 Zachary A. Phelps, Note, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing the
Inequities Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 981, 1006-07
(2004).
27 Id. at 1007.
28 Id. at 1006. The determination of what constitutes the "top 25% of all NFL stadiums"
was not made clear. See Jo Mannies, Rams Stay Is Tied to "Ranking" of New Stadium After 10
Years, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1 A.
29 Phelps, supra note 26, at 1005.
30 Id. at 1007-08.
31 Id. at 1008 (noting the city's lack of bargaining power and the extremes of the contract).
32 Editorial, Close Loophole That Has the Public Subsidizing Ever Glitzier Stadiums, THE
BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 11, 1996.
33 Id.
3 Greenburg, supra note 18, at 392.
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summarized by Arlington, Texas mayor Richard E. Greene, who
justified his support for a new stadium for his city's Rangers by
stating that "[y]ou don't build a stadium because the rich owners and
the millionaire players need the money... [y]ou do it because other
communities are willing to do it."
35
B. How Cities Justify the Expenditure of Public Funds for
Professional Sports Stadiums
Mayor Greene's sober analysis aside, many cities have attempted
to justify their leap into bed with professional sports teams on various
economic and non-economic grounds. Upon closer inspection, these
claims appear to be specious.
1. Economic Benefits
In Arlington, a consulting/accounting firm hired to study the
feasibility of the proposed stadium concluded that the new stadium
would create 5100 jobs and $140 million of new money in the city of
Arlington the first year the stadium was operational.36 In Cincinnati,
an economic impact study commissioned by Hamilton County and
done by the University of Cincinnati concluded that the construction
of two new stadiums would bring a one-time economic benefit of
$1.3 billion to the county and that the total economic impact of both
the NFL's Bengals and MLB's Reds playing in new stadiums would
be $296 million along with the creation of 6883 jobs.37 In northern
Virginia, the 1996 Final Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying
Financing Options for the Purpose of Constructing a Baseball
Stadium in Virginia concluded that such a stadium would add $137
million to the Virginia economy, create 1000 jobs and result in $32
million in new wages.38 These projections are typical. Many cities
considering the construction of new stadiums have trumpeted similar
public benefits. David Lonergan, who has been vocal in his support of
publicly funded stadiums and whose company specializes in stadium
funding alternatives, stated that he believes that for every $1 spent on
35 Todd Senkiewicz, Comment, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 575, 582 (1998).
36 Id. at 581.
37 Phillip M. Sparkes, From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball Stadium
Financing Projects-Cincinnati, 34 URB. LAW. 345, 348-49 (2002).
38 COMMONWEALTH OF VA., FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMM. STUDYING
FINANCING OPTIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING A BASEBALL STADIUM IN VA., H.
1997-7, reprinted in Andrew Gasper, Note, Senator Moynihan 's Field of Dreams: If you Build
it, They Will Come.., but not at the Federal Taxpayer's Expense, 17 VA. TAx. REV. 341, A5
(1997).
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professional sports, household income raises $.17 and that an
additional $1.75 is pumped into the economy.39 It is for these reasons
that some public officials believe (or at least tout) that stadium
construction is in the public interest in that it supposedly jumpstarts
the local economy and can actually revive dying communities.4 °
These claims have been repeatedly studied and found to be without
merit, however. As stated by economist Andrew Zimbalist, "[f]ew
fields of empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of
findings. Yet, independent work on the economic impact of stadiums
and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant
positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic
development. '41 By way of but one example, a 1997 study conducted
by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found that of the 30
stadium projects considered in the study, 27 had no discernable
economic impact on the community and three had, of all things, a
negative impact.42 Baltimore's stadium building experience is typical:
the CRS found that its newly constructed football stadium did indeed
create jobs, albeit at a cost of $127,000 per position-more than 21
times the $6,250 it cost to create each new job through Maryland's
general economic development fund.43 Overall, stadium construction
resulted in a negative economic impact upon the community given the
diversion of economic resources. 44 Its baseball stadium, long hailed as
an economic success story, produced similar dubious benefits. A mid-
1990's study of Oriole Park at Camden Yards found that it generated
approximately $3 million annually but at a cost of $14 million to
Maryland taxpayers.45
Far from the claims made on behalf of professional sports
franchises, they very often have little or no impact on local economies
because, despite the proliferation of media coverage they generate
and the overwhelming role these teams play in popular culture,
comparatively speaking, they are surprisingly small enterprises. One
economist, who has studied the interrelationship between sports and
local economies since 1987, has concluded that, on the whole,
"hosting a franchise has less economic impact on a city in terms of
39 Mayer, supra note 19, at 212.
40 See id. The article attributed the growth of Phoenix's downtown area to the construction
of Arizona's Bank One Ballpark. Cleveland's new stadiums have also been hailed as helping
"the city escape some of the urban blight that had plagued the area." Id. at 213.
41 Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 22, at 103.
42 See Senkiewicz, supra note 35, at 589.
43 See Irwin M. Stelzer, Socked for Stadiums, N. Y. POST, August 29, 1996.
4 See Joseph L. Bast, Sports Stadium Madness: Why it Started, How to Stop It, POLICY
STUDY #85 (The Heartland Institute), Feb. 23, 1998, at 4.
45 Greenburg, supra note 18, at 388.
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direct revenue and employment than attracting a medium-sized
department store.' '46 The numbers bear this out: most teams employ
approximately 70-130 people in their front offices and hire another
1000-1500 day-of-game personnel who perform unskilled, temporary
work for low hourly wages.47 Zimbalist concluded, generously, that
for a typical NFL team playing 10 home games per season, the
cumulative annual effect of day-of-game employment was the
equivalent of perhaps 20-30 full time, year-round jobs at best.48
Accordingly, the impact of these businesses is negligible: for a
medium-sized city such as St. Louis, Zimbalist concluded that its
baseball team accounts for less than .3% of local economic activity.49
Larger cities such as New York feel even less impact from their
teams: a baseball team in Gotham contributes less than .03% to the
city's economy.50 Moreover, whatever low-paying jobs are created
typically do not help to jump start the economy as low-paying jobs
tend to follow high-paying jobs and not vice-versa.51 Thus, the benefit
of these temporary jobs extends no further than the limited benefits
offered by these jobs themselves; they do not stimulate growth and do
not lead to other, more stable jobs-jobs complete with benefits and
stability that would indeed help to grow the local economy.
Opportunity costs further erode the impact of stadium construction
as well as consumer dollars spent on professional sports
entertainment. Public spending on construction means that less public
money is spent on other projects such as parks, public buildings and
infrastructure improvements that likewise would promote the image
of the city and act as a public good.5 2 In addition, consumer spending
on sports entertainment results in less spending on other forms of
entertainment. 53 The net result of all this is that, at best, spending on
professional sports represents a shift in resources and not the creation
46 See Gasper, supra note 38, at 361. Gasper cites a study conducted by Professor Robert
Baade, which was subsequently relied upon by the CRS in its study of the impact of stadiums on
local communities. Baade found a lower rate of economic growth in cities that chose sports
development strategies than in those cities that chose other routes to achieve economic growth.
In sum, Baade concluded that, at best, the impact of sports stadium development is insignificant
if it is not detrimental, at least in comparison with the myriad other ways the money directed
toward stadium development could have been spent.
47 Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 22, at 104.
48 Id.
49 Id.
5 Id.
s1 See Bast, supra note 44, at 13 (citing economists, such as Robert Baade, who conclude
that, since the growth of low paying jobs typically follow the creation of high paying jobs, the
creation of high paying jobs is what is needed to foster economic growth).
32 Id. at 4-5, 16.
53 Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 22, at 108-10.
[Vol. 58:1
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS
of new ones.54 From the city's perspective, this shift is not without
risk in that the debt created by the use of public funds on projects that
generate such little economic impact may affect the city's credit
rating with the result being that, in the future, it would have to pay a
higher interest rate on future loans.55 In the end, the city's taxpayers
bear the brunt of the city's urge to attract or retain a professional
sports team at any cost.
In sum, the existence of professional sports teams does little to
bolster a city's economy despite loud claims to the contrary. Worse,
many professional sports stadiums are such bad deals for cities that
one economist, Roger Noll of Stanford, concluded that cities which
build them should expect to suffer losses of $20-25 million
annually.56 To all of the team owners who argue otherwise, Professor
Noll provides the most basic and obvious retort: if these stadiums
were the surefire economic goldmines their supporters claim them to
be, they would build them themselves. 7 That they do not, that they
instead look to public entities to foot the bill (and therefore take some
of the revenue), says all anyone needs to know regarding their
profitability.
2. Non-Economic Benefits
Supporters of professional sports team stadium construction
likewise tout the non-economic benefits that allegedly flow from
these projects. Like the economic claims, these too appear to be
specious upon examination.
Proponents of a new baseball stadium in St. Louis urged the
passage of a bill funding construction for it by claiming that keeping
the Cardinals in the city would save it from irrelevance. State Senate
President pro tempore Peter Kinder stated that "the survival of the
City of St. Louis is on the line. I don't think St. Louis would be much
without the Cardinals. 58 Without its professional sports teams,
Kinder believed that St. Louis "would risk becoming another big
54 Id. See also Mayer, supra note 19, at 215.
55 See Bast, supra note 44, at 4-5. Bast cites Dean V. Baim, who authored a previous
Heartland Policy Study who concluded that "[s]tadium construction is not a low-risk
investment." Dean V. Bairn, Sports Stadiums as 'Wise Investments': An Evaluation, POLICY
STuDy #32, (The Heartland Institute), Nov. 26, 1990, at 6.
56 See Gasper, supra note 38, at 361.
57 Id. (according to Noll, if stadiums brought in all the revenue franchise owners claimed
they did, they would not be as willing as they are to turn over a portion of their profits to the city
governments they currently require to provide the bulk of the financing).
58 Joel K. Goodstein, From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball Stadium
Financing Projects-St. Louis, 34 URB. LAW. 397, 403 (2002).
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Omaha., 59 This claim is typical as the "big league" image of a given
city is often believed to be the result of the presence of the
professional sports teams that call it their home.60 In Charlotte, for
example, its Chamber of Commerce vice president pointed to the
arrival of new NBA, NHL and NFL teams in the 1990's as the
lynchpin for the city's national image makeover: "Charlotte was in a
situation where it was an unheard of community 10 years ago," he
said. "With professional sports, we've gone a long way towards
getting known.' In short, "big league" cities play host to "big
league" teams, or so the theory goes. In the never-ending competition
between and among cities (defined as "Homeric" and worthy of
Freudian analysis according to one commentator), cities with major
league teams consider themselves superior to those without them;
referring to such outposts as "backwaters" or "second-tier"
communities.62 Although this might seem silly and even though the
economic impact of these teams is negligible, these feelings are, in
the words of the same commentator, "nonetheless real."63 Cities, just
like the teams that call them their home, compete and use these teams
as the basis for their competition. As such, the emotional stakes are
high indeed and any advantage is one worth considering, regardless of
its financial impact.
Beyond competitive advantages, supporters of stadium
construction sometimes tout the "renewed civic pride" resulting from
the gleaming new edifices. 64 Increased opportunities to promote the
city as a tourist destination and even improved racial harmony have
also been cited as justifications.65 However, all of this could just as
easily be achieved by means other than the construction of costly and
economically inefficient stadiums. Improved police protection, well-
tended parks and other public buildings would likewise raise civic
pride and render the city more attractive to outsiders. To the extent
that these improvements are foregone due to the shifting of limited
resources to stadium construction, it is difficult to conclude that a city
59 Id.
60 See generally STEVEN A. REISS, TOUCHING BASE: PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AND
AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1999). (Reiss studied the history and
progression of the "big league" city movement and found that it is closely tied with the
identities of the professional sports teams that call these cities their home).
61 Senkiewicz, supra note 35, at 593.
62 See Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 65. ("These are epic themes better
comprehended by Homeric poets or Freudian analysts than by economists, but they are
nonetheless real.").
63 Id.
64 See Gasper, supra note 38, at 364.
65 See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE
AMERICAN METROPOLIS, Ch. 1 (1997).
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is better off merely because a new stadium is built. 66 Once again,
opportunity costs must be factored into the equation.
C. The Clear Beneficiaries of Stadium Construction
While the public benefits of stadium construction are dubious to
say the least, the benefits to sports franchise owners are not. Stadium
construction puts money in their pockets quickly and in more than
one way. First and most directly, franchises see an immediate
increase in operating revenue as a result of new and improved streams
of revenue that flow from the new stadium-revenue created by the
below-market rents and above-market perks received as a result of the
competition between communities to secure the team.67 Second, the
value of franchises also seems to rise as a result of the new facilities.
By way of three representative examples, the Baltimore Orioles were
sold in 1988 while they played in decaying Memorial Stadium for $70
million. Five years later, and one year after moving into Oriole Park
at Camden Yards, they were sold again, this time for $173 million. 68
In Texas, the Rangers were sold in 1989 for $46 million and resold in
1998 for five times that amount, $250 million, with the team's
glimmering new stadium cited as the primary reason for the team's
rapid increase in value.69 In the NFL, the Cleveland Browns, playing
in Cleveland's Memorial Stadium, were estimated to be worth $160
million in 1995 but $200 million two years later when they moved
into a brand new stadium in Baltimore. 7° Given that, without
exception, cities have borne the brunt of the costs while franchises
have reaped the majority of the benefits that flow from stadium
construction, more than one commentator has concluded that cities
are clearly unable to adequately protect the interests of their taxpayers
solely by contract. 71 In this atmosphere, teams have an interest in
maintaining so-called franchise free agency because, as the above has
illustrated, it allows them to maximize revenue and reduce costs, both
of which ultimately increase profitability.
Although arguably, the four major sports leagues have the ability
to control franchise free agency through league bylaws that mandate
66 See Bast, supra note 44, at 16.
67 See Senkiewicz, supra note 35, at 594 (explaining the boost in operating revenue and
franchise value that a new stadium brings); Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 65 (explaining
how sports teams obtain below-market rates).
6 Senkiewicz, supra note 35, at 594.
69 Id.
70 Gasper, supra note 38, at 362.
71 See Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 97 (demonstrating the unequal power between
cities and franchise owners).
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majority or super-majority approval by league members before any
particular relocation is permitted, historically they have demonstrated
that they are unwilling or unable to police themselves. Between 1950
and 1982, 78 franchises relocated with leagues throwing up
roadblocks only when personal vendettas, rather than the protection
of individual communities, appeared to be involved.72 Major League
Baseball has stepped in to prevent relocation by maverick owners
such as Bill Veeck and Charles 0. Finley; the National Football
League attempted to thwart renegade owner Al Davis from moving
his Raiders from Oakland to Los Angeles.73 Other than attempts to
even a personal score, however, these leagues, along with the NBA
and NHL have rarely acted with zeal to protect a city's best interest or
fans by thwarting relocation. Although the 9th Circuit's 1984 opinion
in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League
(commonly referred to as Raiders /)74 may have shed doubt on at least
the NFL's ability to control relocation through its bylaws, 75 in
practice the decision made little difference; most leagues were not
using this power anyway.
The imbalance of power between team and city has only been
amplified in recent decades as start-up costs for new leagues have
skyrocketed to the point where today there is little threat of new
teams from rival leagues potentially entering existing markets and
providing the host city with at least some negotiating leverage.76
Given the overwhelming costs involved in starting a rival major
league caliber baseball, football, basketball or hockey league and the
small chance of success, the four leagues that currently exist are now
more assured than ever that there will be no outside challengers
competing for a given city's resources. As such, the teams in these
established leagues can confidently maximize their monopoly power
through the exercise of geographic exclusivity, allowing them to exert
ever more pressure on cities to squeeze out sub-market rents and
above-market perks.77 Quite simply, without these teams, cities have
nowhere else to turn for top-tier professional sports in their markets.
Because of this, Congress has attempted, amid much criticism, to
insert itself into the equation on several different occasions in order to
72 Id. at 104.
73 Id. ("Apparently, 'personal animosity' and other factors motivated these actions, rather
than an honest desire to protect a host city's interests.").
-" 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
75 See id. at 1384 (rule 4.3 of the bylaws, which required 3/4' vote of owners to relocate,
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and as such the NFL could not stop relocation in this
method; this lead to a relocation flurry in the NFL throughout the 1980's and 90's).
76 See Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 96.
77 See Mayer, supra note 19, at 206.
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level the playing field. Much of the criticism has labeled such
attempts by Congress as "protectionist measure[s] that fl[y] in the
face of the American ideal of competitive markets, open markets and
a free market economy. ,78 Although such criticism glosses over, or
simply ignores, the abusive monopoly power on one side of the
bargaining table and the helplessness, as a result of league-imposed
and Congressional approved geographic exclusivity, on the other, it
has been effective in thwarting several popularly supported bills that
have been introduced in both houses of Congress within the past
decade and a half. The following section reviews the genesis of these
bills and the reasons for their failure.
D. Proposed Congressional Legislation
Without exception, all of the proposed legislation focused on the
harms caused by out-of-market relocation, i.e., teams moving from
one exclusive geographic region to another (such as the Colts' 1980's
relocation from Baltimore to Indianapolis), rather than in-market
relocation, i.e., teams relocating within their existing exclusive
geographic regions (such as the 1970's relocation of the New York
Giants from New York City to East Rutherford, New Jersey). After
the uncertainty created by 9t" Circuit's Raiders I decision, Congress
attempted on several occasions, prompted by the relocation or
threatened relocation of various NFL teams which took advantage of
the decision to exercise their seemingly unfettered right to threaten
relocation unless new stadiums were built for them, to make such
moves less attractive by withholding federal money for the
construction of these stadiums unless certain conditions were met.
79
None, however, were passed into law.
The first such bill was 1992's Professional Sports Franchise
Stabilization Act, which would have required franchises to negotiate
in good faith with their local governments before they could seek to
relocate elsewhere. 0 Only when the local government demonstrated
an unwillingness to address the inadequacies pinpointed by the
franchise would relocation be permitted. In essence, this bill provided
a quasi "right of first refusal" to the home city.8' Three years later,
The Fans Right Act of 1995 was proposed which differed from the
78 Anoop K. Bhasin, Tax Exempt Bond Financing of Sports Stadiums: Is the Price Right?,
7 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 181, 194 (2000).
79 See Alvin B. Lindsay, Note, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The Trademark Rights
of Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REv. 915, 932 (2000).
so See Michele Cotrupe, Note, Curbing Franchise Free Agency: The Professional Sports
Franchise Relocation Act of1998, 9 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 165, 174-75 (1998).
81 Id.
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Professional Sports Franchise Stabilization Act in that it called for an
antitrust exemption for the NFL, NBA and NHL that would overrule
Raiders I and permit these leagues to restrict the mobility of their
franchises (Major League Baseball was not included in the Act due to
its existing antitrust exemption stemming from the Supreme Court's
1922 opinion in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Base Ball Clubs 2).83 Following these were a
litany of other bills such as the Fans Rights Act of 1995,84 the Fan
Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995,85 The Fan Freedom
and Community Protection Act of 1996,86 the Professional Sports
Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996,87 the Sports Relocation Reform
Act of 1996,88 the Sports Antitrust Reform Act of 1996,89 the Stop
Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act (STADIA),90 the Team
Relocation Taxpayers Protection Act of 1996,91 the Professional
Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998,92 and the Stadium
Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999. 93 Most of these bills
were similar in that they proposed an antitrust exemption for the NFL,
NBA and NHL; some also linked the receipt of federal dollars for
stadium construction to a franchise's exhaustion of effort to remain
within its current geographic region. Only after several conditions had
been met, such as notice to the local government of an intent to
relocate and good faith negotiations thereafter, would federal dollars
be made available under these bills for stadium construction.
82 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
83 See Lindsay, supra note 79, at 933-34.
84 S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995) (would have required professional sports teams to meet
certain criteria, e.g., good faith negotiations with hometown, before permitting relocation).
85 H.R. 2740, 104"' Cong. (1995) (would have required professional sports teams to
provide advance notice of departure, among other things, in case of relocation).
86 H.R. 2740, 104"h Cong. (1996) (re-introduced in second session and identical to
previous bill except for relocation provision).
87 S. 1696, 104th Cong. (1996) (would have allowed leagues to devise and enforce rules
concerning member teams' proposed relocation).
88 H.R. 3805, 104'h Cong. (1996) (would have required sports leagues to take such factors
as fan loyalty into consideration before approving relocation).
89 S. 1767, 104"h Cong. (1996) (also would have required fan loyalty to be taken into
consideration).
90 S. 1880, 104' Cong. (1996); S. 122, 105' Cong. (1997); H.R. 916, 107"' Cong. (2001)
(each of the foregoing identical bills would have changed the tax-exempt status of professional
sports team financing).
91 S. 1529, 104t Cong. (1996) (would have forbidden any tax benefits or deductions for
an NFL team choosing to relocate if certain conditions were met).
92 H.R. 3817, 105' Cong. (1998) (would have ensured that leagues which set policies for
members' relocations would not violate antitrust statutes).
93 S. 952, 106"h Cong. (1999) (would have expanded the antitrust exemption available for
sports leagues in exchange for members paying for a substantial percentage of construction
costs for new sports facilities).
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The Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995
(FFCPA) was notable for a provision that stated that, should a team
relocate, its registered mark would become the property of its
league.94 Thereafter, the league would reserve the mark for the
community that lost its team until either the mark expired or the
community notified the league that it did not intend to use it.95 Under
another provision of the bill, a league in which a team relocated was
likewise required to offer an expansion team to the spumed
community, which would then presumably make use of the reserved
mark.96 In fact, this is precisely what occurred in the late 1990's when
the NFL's Cleveland Browns relocated to Baltimore but left their
mark and colors in Cleveland. The Browns were rechristened the
Ravens and a few years thereafter Cleveland was awarded an
expansion franchise that assumed the Browns name and colors.
However, this occurred through contract rather than legislation; the
FFCPA, like every other proposed bill, died in committee.
97
Regardless, even had these bills been passed into law, it is doubtful
that they would have had much effect on curbing out-of-market
relocations due to the fact that nearly every one of them rested upon
the flawed premise that an antitrust exemption would have had some
teeth. In essence, these bills assumed that professional football,
basketball and hockey "leagues" were something other than simply an
amalgam of team owners, each of whom might want to relocate
themselves one day. Therefore, as a collective group, these leagues
have been, even before Raiders 1, hesitant to block attempted
relocations (absent the desire to hoist retribution upon a maverick
owner) and, as such, unable to police themselves.
In any event, as teams relocated and all four major leagues
expanded throughout the 1990's, out-of-market relocations became
less frequent as attractive open markets became scarcer. Accordingly,
the desire for legislation waned as the market seems to have corrected
itself, albeit to the detriment of city governments across the country,
without Congressional input. In the NFL, cities such as Nashville,
Charlotte, Jacksonville, Houston, St. Louis, Cleveland and Baltimore
all received either relocated or expansion franchises during the
decade, leaving, by 2007, Los Angeles as perhaps the lone open
market, albeit a powerful one, as a bargaining chip for NFL franchise
owners looking to better their current stadium leases. In Major
League Baseball, the open markets that have been used as bargaining
94 H.R. 2740, 104'h Cong. (1995); see also Lindsay, supra note 79, at 934.
95 H.R. 2740.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 79, at 936; Greenburg, supra note 18, at 398.
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chips for decades-Washington, D.C., Miami and St. Petersburg,
Florida likewise have been filled. Although those who argued against
Congressional intervention in out-of-market relocations were
incorrect in their analysis-as noted earlier, each of these cities
wound up on the wrong end of extremely one-sided and detrimental
lease arrangements-the damage has, for the most part, been done
and there does not appear to be much left, outside of Los Angeles in
the NFL, to inflict. Legislation focusing on out-of-market relocations,
even if properly focused, would be, at this point, much too little and
much too late.
Recent changes in professional sports economics likewise make
the specter of out-of-market relocations less common in the future.
Commentators have correctly noted that, traditionally, revenue
sharing in the NFL, NBA, NHL and even to some extent in Major
League Baseball, helped to make smaller cities more attractive as
alternate destinations and, as such, effective bargaining chips in the
stadium lease negotiating process.98 Because, historically, in the NFL
at least, a team playing in Green Bay, Wisconsin, could reap as much
revenue as a team playing in New York, mid-size metropolitan
markets were considered reasonable destinations for any franchise
with a wandering eye-the mid-1990's relocation of the Rams from
Los Angeles to St. Louis is a prime example of this dynamic. Smaller
cities such as the previously noted Charlotte, looking to upgrade their
image to "big league" status, have often been willing to be overly
generous in lease terms. Because the courted team could reap the
benefits of these terms without suffering a loss of league revenue by
downsizing to a smaller market, these offers were obviously
tantalizing.
Today, this is less true than ever before. Within roughly the past
decade, maximizing revenue depends more on those financial streams
that are not subject to revenue sharing than those that are. In
particular, revenue generated from luxury box sales and stadium-
naming rights are not subject to revenue sharing in the NFL and have,
as a consequence, become the Holy Grail for franchise owners
seeking to maximize profits. Although smaller cities may be able to
provide 60,000 ravenous fans each Sunday, all of this revenue goes
into the league pot. They may be less able, due to a smaller corporate
presence, to fill the many dozens of luxury boxes demanded by team
owners in the course of lease negotiations or which would allow them
to maximize revenue from stadium naming rights, however.
Therefore, a potential relocation from, say, New York to Portland,
98 See Mitten & Burton, supra note 20, at 102.
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Oregon may not be as attractive today as it might have been even a
decade ago. 99 As the difference between playing in a large market and
a smaller one might be the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
available in non-shared revenue, there is now a disincentive to this
sort of downsizing.
In addition, there is television revenue to consider. In Major
League Baseball, smaller markets mean less revenue in local
television deals. In the NFL, although buoyed by network deals
subject to revenue sharing, television revenue might decrease in the
aggregate if more and more teams relocate from larger markets to
smaller ones. At some point, individual team owners might feel
pressured by both their brethren as well as network executives to
reconsider abandoning large, lucrative markets such as Los Angeles
for smaller ones such as St. Louis. Although this certainly did not
prevent the Rams from doing exactly this, there conceivably may
become a point, as the available open cities become smaller and
smaller due to expansion, where the pressure becomes determinative.
As Major League Baseball has expanded from 16 teams in 1960 to 30
teams today, and the NFL has expanded from 12 teams in 1959 to 32
teams today, it is likely that these leagues are closer to this point than
ever before. Given the above economic realities, teams in large
markets have a significant incentive to remain in their current
exclusive geographic regions rather than relocate to smaller ones.
This does not mean, however, that the potential for harm to cities has
diminished. To the contrary, franchises will continue to seek out the
best possible deals for themselves in their never ending quest for
maximum profits. And they will increasingly look within their own
markets to do so.
III. THE DYNAMICS AND HARMS OF IN-MARKET RELOCATIONS
A. The Hidden Costs of In-Market Relocations
Historically, there have been significantly more in-market
relocations than out-of-market ones. As stated earlier, at present there
are many teams in all four major sports that do not play within the
99 See Ashley Fox, After Market Settles, Reese Will Be Ready, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, March 11, 2007, at E2, noting that the Jacksonville Jaguars recently admitted that
they lost money during the 2006 season and that they still are unable to find a naming sponsor
for their stadium. Although the Jaguars, like most NFL teams, regularly sell-out home games
and are the beneficiaries of revenue sharing, this apparently is no longer adequate to keep teams
in the black, as the Jaguars' recent admission attests. Small markets such as Jacksonville, with
smaller corporate bases, may be at a competitive disadvantage that no amount of ticket sales can
overcome.
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legal limits of the geographic region for which they are named.
Regardless, none of the legislation proposed by Congress addressed
these types of relocations and, moreover, some of it expressly
exempted in-market relocations from their scope. In its original
version, the Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995, by
way of example, would not have applied to any relocation "in the case
of a community with a professional sports team if the team relocates
within 60 miles of the community."' 00 Later, the exception was
narrowed to relocations of 25 miles or less.' 0' Still, most in-market
relocations would not have been covered by the Act. The Sports
Antitrust Reform Act of 1996 defined a team's "home territory" so as
to coincide with a franchise's exclusive geographic region: "the term
'home territory' means the geographic metropolitan area within
which a member team operates and plays the majority of its home
games."' 0 2 The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998
contained identical language and further specified that the Act only
applied when a franchise proposed to play in a "new location" outside
of its traditional "home territory."'10 3 Other bills were similar in these
regards.
As for the rationale behind the in-market exceptions carved out of
these bills, one can only speculate. However, given the atmosphere
that led to their proposal, the motivation behind the drafting of the
specific language becomes clearer. These bills were introduced,
typically with great fanfare and haste, by members of Congress
representing the districts threatened with the loss of their home NFL
teams. The potential relocations giving rise to Congressional action
were, without exception, out-of-market ones. As such, the bills were
an attempt at "keeping the home team at home" as one commentator
put it.104 By contrast, in-market relocations usually do not engender
the same sorts of emotional responses. Although, for example,
residents of the city of Dallas during the early 1970's might have
preferred to keep their Cowboys within the city limits, where they had
played in the Cotton Bowl for nearly a decade, few could see the
harm of their short distance relocation to nearby Irving, Texas as it
was much less overt. Once the move was complete they would still be
able to see their team on television every Sunday and could still travel
100 H.R. 2740, 104'h Cong. (1995).
101 The bill was reintroduced in 1996 and was identical with the exception of the relocation
provision. H.R. 2740, 10410 Cong. (1996).
102 S. 1767, 104 th Cong. (1996).
103 H.R. 3817, 105'b Cong. (1998).
104 See Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law
as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1065 (2004).
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to games in nearby Texas Stadium to see them play in person if they
so desired. In the eyes of many, it was merely an instance of no harm,
no foul.
As this example illustrates, because the deprivation of allegiance
of hometown fans is not at issue in these sorts of relocations, the
emotional impact of in-market moves is much less than that of out-of-
market ones. Missing from the equation are the throngs of yelling,
crying, protesting fans barraging City Hall, dominating the local
media and stopping traffic as was the case in Cleveland when the
Browns announced their move to Baltimore. Without question, the
potential relocation of the NBA's Philadelphia 76'ers and NHL's
Philadelphia Flyers to Camden, New Jersey set off a political rumble
in the early 1990's. Fans of these teams, however, largely sat back
and watched the drama unfold, with interest but at a distance. In the
end, they would still be able to see their teams play and could still call
them their own regardless of whether they ended up playing in a new
arena located in South Philadelphia or in one over the Walt Whitman
Bridge in nearby Camden. The harm inflicted by this battle, as is the
case in every potential in-market relocation, however, was no less
severe despite its covert nature.
Although perhaps not as emotionally charged, many of the same
abuses of monopoly power nevertheless occur within the context of
in-market relocations and in some respects, are even more severe. Just
as with the case of threatened out-of-market relocations, sports
franchises are able to extract sub-market rents and above-market lease
concessions when they are able to pit city against nearby suburb or
neighboring town in the battle to win a stadium war. That the battle
occurs within a single geographic region may somewhat lessen the
angst of the hometown fans but it nevertheless results in the same
one-sided leases that are considered so insidious when they occur in
the out-of-market context. Moreover, given the changing economics
of professional sports, these in-market turf wars eliminate whatever
leverage larger cities with established teams held over their smaller,
out-of-market rivals seeking to lure their teams away from them.
Now, by being able to remain within the same geographic region,
franchises no longer have to weigh the potential costs of relocating to
a smaller region with perhaps a smaller fan base and/or less of the
corporate presence so necessary to the team's ability to maximize its
luxury box and stadium naming rights revenue.
As has been demonstrated time and time again, sports franchises
benefit in many ways from their association with large cities even if
they never set foot within their legal boundaries. As stated earlier, it
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was the lure of the large market association that led Arturo Moreno to
shift his team's association from the smaller Anaheim market to the
larger Los Angeles market in 2005.105 The potential increase in local
television revenue along with other marketing advantages drove the
rechristening of the team despite the fact that after the change, the
team played in not only the same city it had for years, but the same
stadium as well. The team remained in place. Only the association
changed. And this was what mattered most to Moreno. 106 Whether
Moreno's assumptions were accurate is irrelevant. Economists can
line up on either side of this issue but that does not change the reality
that Moreno saw value in his team's the association with Los Angeles
over Anaheim. Because he saw value in a particular association, this
by itself gives that association value. At that moment the association
has become a commodity. Likewise, it is the value of this commodity
that more recently has driven the San Francisco 49'ers to steadfastly
maintain their San Francisco affiliation despite their imminent
relocation 45 miles to the south. 10 7 And as the law presently stands,
this valuable asset is free for the taking to anyone who wants it.
B. The True Beneficiaries of the City/Team Relationship
As for why cities have not fought harder, or in most cases at all, to
seek value in return for the benefits provided professional sports
franchises (particularly ones who play in-market but beyond city
limits) through the use of their names, it is very likely that they
believe that they do indeed receive value through the affiliation.
However, closer analysis of this presumed value reveals that it is
illusory.
Historically, whenever city representatives are called upon to
justify the one-sided leases, free land, tax breaks and public money
used to lure or keep a professional sports team, they invariably resort
to the "big league" status these teams supposedly confer upon their
affiliated cities discussed herein in Part III(b)(ii). According to this
rationale, these benefits accrue even when the city loses the stadium
battle so long as it loses to an in-market rival. Thus, as the theory
goes, the use of its name confers value upon the city regardless of the
fact that the team does not actually play there. However, although, for
103See City of Anaheim v. Superior Ct., No. G035159, 2005 WL 1523338 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 27, 2004).
106Id. at *9 (the court stated: "substantial evidence supports a finding that the change to
'Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim' was a marketing decision, in large part due to the large
disparity between the television revenues generated by the Los Angeles Dodgers and the former
Anaheim Angels.").
107 See Vega, supra note 2.
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example, city leaders may have worried that the departure of MLB's
Cardinals would turn their city into another Omaha,' 0 8 in reality, it
was the Cardinals who benefited from the association with a large city
such as St. Louis as much or perhaps even more than did the city with
the team.
In truth, the four major professional sports leagues are under just
as much pressure as cities to maintain or enhance their "big time"
status. Without it, local and national television revenue, among other
things, would most likely decrease significantly. Consider the NFL,
for example: one wonders if the same billions of dollars would be
heaped upon the league by large broadcast and cable networks if the
league was populated with the likes of the Irving Cowboys, East
Rutherford Giants, Orchard Park Bills, Landover Redskins and Santa
Clara 49'ers rather than the major cities with which these teams are
currently associated. In fact, such a league harkens back to the early
days of the NFL, when the league fought to overcome its second class
status perpetuated, at least in part, from the small towns which flew
the nascent league's banner.
At the time of the formation of the NFL, Major League Baseball
ruled the American professional sports world with teams located in
every major east coast and Midwestern city. While baseball could
legitimately call itself the country's national pastime with teams
representing cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Washington,
Boston, Chicago, St. Louis and Detroit, the NFL was populated with
teams representing burgs such as Canton, Toledo, Rock Island,
Racine, Dayton, Evansville and, of all places, LaRue, Ohio (the
Oorang Indians who were named after a local dog kennel).' 09 It did
not take much to conclude that, compared to Major League Baseball,
the NFL was small time and minor league. Other than Chicago, the
NFL lacked status because it lacked affiliation with what were then
America's "big time" cities. As the league strove for legitimacy, it
dropped its affiliation with these smaller locales and developed ones
with larger ones. And in at least one instance, this process presaged
Moreno's re-branding of his Angels.
108 Goodstein, supra note 58, at 403.
09 See 1922 Standings, http://www.pro-football-reference.com/years/1922.htm. See also
Oorang Indians, http://www.profootballhof.com/history/decades/1920s/oorang.jsp. The team
was organized by Walter Lingo, who owned the Oorang Dog Kennels in LaRue. He organized
the team for the sole purpose of advertising his kennels and selling Airedale Terriers. He
recruited football legend Jim Thorpe for the Indians and then sent them packing, touring other
cities so as to advertise his kennels and terriers available back in LaRue. Because of the
underlying purpose of his team, the Indians played only one home game and that was played in
nearby Marion, Ohio due to the absence of a football field in LaRue.
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1. The Frankford Yellow Jackets
In 1924, after a successful stint barnstorming against NFL teams,
the Frankford Yellow Jackets, a team located in a North Philadelphia
neighborhood, were granted entry into the league."10 Although a good
and soon-to-be great team, the Yellow Jackets, like most teams in the
league, often failed to draw much of a crowd or much exposure in the
press: high school football typically was more heavily covered."' In
their initial season, the team went 11-2-1 in NFL league play (and 17-
3-1 overall; teams were permitted to play games against opponents
outside of the league) and in 1925 were once again a top team.
Regardless, the provincialism created by the Frankford affiliation
continued to haunt the team as it was not widely accepted by the
larger geographic region." 2 In 1926, an upstart league, the AFL
(American Football League) was formed and soon, the Yellow
Jackets had a rival in the Philadelphia Quakers. Despite being the
more established team in the more established league (and a great
team at that: the Yellow Jackets would win the 1926 NFL
Championship), the Yellow Jackets were routinely outdrawn by the
Quakers even though both teams played some of their games in the
same stadium: Philadelphia's Shibe Park. By 1931, with the team
foundering due to lack of support, a push was made by some in the
local sports media to help stir up interest in the team by unofficially
rechristening it the Philadelphia Yellow Jackets.' '3 But by then it was
too late: the Yellow Jackets folded due to lack of support from the
Philadelphia sporting public. 1
14
Two years later, in 1933, the franchise's league license was sold to
a new owner, Bert Bell, who was not about to recreate the mistake
made when the franchise was born. This time, in a shift of allegiances
echoed by Moreno over 70 years later, the team's geographic
association would be broader: Philadelphia. Hence, the Philadelphia
Eagles, a team playing under the same league license originally
awarded to the Frankford Yellow Jackets, were born and very quickly
became the city's team rather than the representative of one small part
of it.115 Across the league, as the decades passed, similar changes
were taking place: small burgs were abandoned in favor of large
I"oSee Frankford Yellow Jackets: National Football League Champions, 1926,
http://ghosts.footballhistory.org/Yellowjackets.htm.
I See Frank Fitzpatrick, Why Did Winning Coach Leave Philly?, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 15, 2007, E2.
12 See id.; Frankford Yellow Jackets, supra note 110.
113 See Frankford Yellow Jackets, supra note 110.
114Id
I ISee id.
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cities. By the early 1970's, the NFL would have teams in every city
that also hosted an MLB team. At this point, no one could reasonably
deny the NFL's claim that it was a "big time" league at last; equal to
Major League Baseball in every detail. As for who benefited more
from the marriage of city to team, one could take either side.
However, it is likely that the league, and therefore the individual
teams that comprise it, realized significant benefits in status and, as a
result, financially. As this example illustrates, sports franchises
require the association with large cities perhaps as much, if not more,
than cities need the franchises. In any event, it is, at a minimum, the
proverbial two-way street in this regard.
2. The Effect of Current Law: A Lose-Lose Proposition for Cities
Negotiating With Professional Sports Franchises
None of this is to suggest that the NFL would return to the bygone,
barnstorming era of the Frankford Yellow Jackets and Oorang Indians
without its affiliation with large cities. However, it seems fair to
question whether its image, and therefore its financial power, would
suffer, at least somewhat, without them. Perhaps network television
deals would be smaller by a few degrees, and stadium naming rights
contracts slightly less lucrative, if the league's geographic
designations were downsized. If in fact this would be the case, and it
seems reasonable to assume that it would, then there exists a value to
professional sports franchises' geographic association with large
cities. As such, in-market relocations ultimately harm these cities in
that the relocated team is able to profit off of the association for free;
the shunned city receives nothing for the valuable use of its name.
Viewed in this light, cities are harmed whenever a team even
threatens an in-market relocation: if they "win" by outbidding a rival
suburb, they really lose due to the sub-market rents and above-market
lease concessions they are forced to offer in order to woo the team
looking to maximize its profit; if they lose the bidding and the team,
they lose even more through the uncompensated use of their name by
the abandoning team. Thus, as the law currently stands, because there
is no cost to a team that relocates in-market (it reaps the fruit of the
bidding war between city and suburb, knowing that regardless of who
wins, it will be able to maintain its valuable association with the city)
cities are, in effect, paying a premium (through these unfavorable
leases) for the team's ability to freely use its name. As this result is
absurd, legal protection to cities to prevent this dynamic is necessary.
If any party should pay a premium for the use of the city's name, it is
the team that profits from it, not the city harmed by it.
20071
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The situation outlined above is not a rare or contrived one. In fact,
it is quite common and is likely to become even more commonplace
in the future as in-market relocations become even more favored than
they are now. Through rapid expansion and the frequent out-of-
market relocations of the 1990's, available large markets have
become scarce. The changing economics of professional sports,
particularly within the NFL, discussed above, likewise has made
smaller markets less attractive than they were previously. In
Jacksonville, for example, the NFL's vision of revenue sharing utopia
came crashing down when it was revealed in 2007 that despite the
common pool, the Jaguars lost money due to the fact that the small
corporate presence in Jacksonville has made it exceedingly difficult
for the team to secure new naming rights for its stadium. The New
Orleans Saints experienced similar problems even pre-Hurricane
Katrina, resulting in yet another struggling mid-market franchise due
to a lack of what is now considered a necessary stream of revenue.
Accordingly, in the future, teams looking to better their financial lot
may think twice before abandoning a large market for a smaller one.
Although this should, in theory, lead to a reduction of bargaining
leverage on behalf of the franchises, the ever-availability of no-cost
in-market relocations restores it in practice.
Without legal recognition of the changing realities of the team/city
relationship, this practice will continue unabated into the future as the
in-market suburbs will always be available to serve as no-cost
bargaining chips for teams looking to maximize profits at the expense
of their hometowns. The concept of geographic exclusivity guarantees
this reality. Moreover, with the disappearance and decreasing allure
of available out-of-market cities, in-market battles represent the best-
case scenario from the perspective of many teams now and into the
future in that they allow teams to maximize revenue while
maintaining their fan base. As such, the risks, such as they are,
presented by out-of-market moves are non-existent here. If however,
cities were afforded limited property rights to their names, the
inequalities presented within the in-market relocation battle
disappear. Section V examines the form and scope of such a right.
IV. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is "the right of every person to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.' '1 6 More specifically, it gives
116 J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete's Identity: The
Right of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 197
(2001).
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the individual the right to prevent or, for a fee, permit the use of his or
her identity in such a way that benefits someone else commercially." 17
As such, it allows the individual to receive value in exchange for
another's use of the name for commercial purposes." 8 In this regard,
it is not unlike a form of property right. 119 It is also, however, not
unlike a privacy right when it is used to prevent the unauthorized use
of one's name. First formally recognized in the Second Circuit's 1953
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.120 opinion
(coincidentally, a case that likewise dealt with the interplay between
sports and the law), it is a right that, at its core, borrows from both but
ultimately stands independent of each. Although right of publicity
cases typically involve celebrities (as their names carry the most
value), the right applies to everyone, providing that they are flesh and
blood human beings; corporations, treated as individuals in most
other ways under the law, cannot avail themselves of this right.'
21
Neither can geographic identities such as cities or famous landmarks,
although as discussed below, consideration has been given in some
contexts to readdressing this limitation. Until recently, the right of
publicity has been one that falls under state rather than federal law. 122
Just over half of the states provide for such a right, with the majority
of these providing so via statute.1
23
A. The A CPA
In 1999, however, a limited form of this right was arguably
codified in the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(the "ACPA"). 124 In order to prevent improper profiteering with
regard to Internet domain names, much of the ACPA targets
registered names that are confusingly similar to famous marks. As the
Sixth Circuit in Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte held, "[r]egistering a
famous trademark as a domain name and then offering it for sale to
the trademark owner is exactly the wrong Congress intended to
remedy when it passed the ACPA."' 125 Accordingly, it was added to
the federal Lanham Act in order to protect these trademark owners
17 ld. at 197-98.
I s See id.
191d. at 196-97.
120202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
121 McCarthy & Anderson, supra note 116, at 200 ("it makes no sense to talk about the
right of publicity of Microsoft or Toyota-there is no such thing.").
1'ld. at 199.
123 Id (as of 2001, 28 states recognized a right of publicity, 18 by statute and 10 by
common law).
1-24 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)-(d), 1129 (2000).
1- 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
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and is triggered whenever someone "'registers, traffics in or uses' an
offending domain name.'' 26 Before it was passed, however, at the
11 th hour, the ACPA was amended to also include protection against
the use of non-trademarked personal names for the purpose of
profiteering. This "personal name" protection legislation was
ultimately codified in section 3001(b) of Title III which itself was
contained within the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999.127 The protection afforded under this
provision is quite limited and specific and is thought to be, by at least
some commentators, perhaps the first federal codification of at least a
limited right of publicity, regardless of Congress's protestations to the
contrary:
In sum, this subsection is a narrow provision intended to
curtail one form of "cybersquatting"--the act of registering
someone else's name as a domain name for the purpose of
demanding remuneration from the person in exchange for the
domain name. Neither this section nor any other section in
this bill is intended to create a right of publicity of any kind
with respect to domain names. 12
8
Pursuant to the personal name provision, whenever someone
registers a name with the intent to profit off of it, liability is triggered
(in the form of injunctive relief; money damages are not available)
even though the individual harmed does not otherwise have a
recognized legal right to their name, such as in the case of
cybersquatted trademarks. 129  It is for this reason that some
commentators believe that a federal right of publicity has been
created notwithstanding the above congressional clarification. 1
30
126J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
25:78 (4" ed. 2006).
,27 Id. at § 25:80. Technically, it is not part of the Lanham Act and is found instead in 15
U.S.C. § 1129 (2000).
1
28SENATE SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 145 CONG. REc. S14715 (Nov. 17, 1999),
quoted in MCCARTHY, supra note 126, at § 25:80.
129 Pursuant to the ACPA, "a court may award injunctive relief, including the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff. The court
may also, in its discretion, award costs and attorneys fees to the prevailing party." MCCARTHY,
supra note 126, at § 25:80.
130 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past
Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1420 (2005) (Lipton noted that, like the
right of publicity, the federally created right sounds similar to a property right as well as a
privacy right); See also Neil L. Martin, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act:
Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word on Domain Name Disputes, 25 J.
CORP. L. 591, 605 (2000) ("Despite Congress' claim to the contrary, section 3002(b) creates an
action that resembles a right of publicity claim.").
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If it is not a right of publicity, it is difficult to grasp what, then, it
is, as the elements of the federal statutory claim are substantially
similar to the generally recognized elements of a right of publicity
claim. Under both, four elements need to be proven: (1) the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of the
plaintiffs name or likeness to the defendant's commercial advantage;
(3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.' 3' The federal claim may
provide a somewhat more vigorous challenge to those seeking to fall
under its protection in that it requires specific intent on behalf of the
defendant to profit from the use of the plaintiffs name but in all other
respects, the elements are virtually identical. 32 Non-celebrity
plaintiffs might also face a steep practical challenge in succeeding
under the ACPA in that numerous cases considering this provision of
the Act have likewise required the plaintiff to prove that his or her
name is famous or distinctive such that it has developed a secondary
meaning. Non-celebrities would have a difficult time establishing the
existence of a secondary meaning of an indistinct name. 133 That the
two are so closely related is only natural in that, on a larger scale, the
Lanham Act itself is considered by some practitioners to be a close
relative of the right of publicity. 134 The personal name protection
section of the ACPA might simply be the most explicit example of
this reality.
Like the state law right of publicity, the personal name provision
of the ACPA presently applies only to flesh and blood human beings.
Recently, however, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), a domain name dispute resolution organization accredited
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") which itself is a private entity charged with the
responsibility of managing and coordinating the domain name system
by overseeing the distribution of Internet addresses and domain
names, has begun to consider the feasibility of an expansion of the
protection of identities beyond personal names. 35 For just as with the
case of the appropriation of an individual's name for commercial
purpose, culturally significant names and geographic locations are
similarly at risk for abuse by profiteers. |36 The Report of the Second
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process suggested further consideration
131 See Martin, supra note 130, at 605.
132 Id.
133 See Jonathan H. Gastik, Note, Cybersquating: Identity Theft in Disguise, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 277, 282-83 (2001).
134 JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET: FORMS AND
ANALYsIS § 11.05[2] (2001).
135 See Lipton, supra note 130, at 1435.
136 Id
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of the issue, indicating increasing awareness of the issues that arise
whenever an individual or entity attempts to profit off of the name of
someone or something else.'
37
Certainly, protection, under the ACPA or, more generally,
pursuant to the right of publicity, of culturally significant names and
geographic locations presents unique challenges. For example,
deciding which group has the strongest legal interest in, say, the
Grand Canyon, and which therefore would be able to seek legal
protection from profiteers might be difficult to establish: "the social
and cultural norms that might be protected by granting legal rights in
these names are probably harder to establish with any degree of
certainty that those that might be protected with respect to trademarks
and personal names."'138 A more limited right, however, one which
extends no further than to the protection of legally recognized
geographic identities such as states, cities and incorporated political
subdivisions would be much easier to administer. Further, the failure
to recognize these rights results in real and identifiable harm. Without
action on this issue soon, "commercial interests. . . will come to
dominate all law and policy as it applies to domain names. It is
possible that very real interests are being overlooked and will
continue to be overlooked, unless the debate is refocused to take
account of some of these issues."'139 As the trampling of interests
within the context of in-market sports franchise relocations attests,
this is likewise true outside of the realm of the Internet and beyond
the scope of the ACPA.
B. Beyond the A CPA
The discussion currently taking place within WIPO and the
expansion of the ACPA to include protection for personal names
indicates the growing concern for the protection of identities of many
different types, at least within the parameters of the Internet. Now that
Congress has taken its furthest step yet in establishing a limited
federal right of publicity, it perhaps is time for it to consider similar
harms suffered outside of the realm of cyberspace-by cities
whenever their names are appropriated by professional sports teams
that threaten to relocate in-market. Once equipped with this right,
cities will then be able to engage in fair and level negotiations with
sports franchises seeking new stadiums or renegotiated lease terms.
Just as the right of publicity and the ACPA level the proverbial
137 Id.
138 Id.
1391d. at 1437-38.
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playing field by requiring an individual seeking to use another's name
to pay for the privilege of doing so, the financial burden with regard
to in-market relocations will be placed on the appropriate party as
well: the one seeking to use the name rather than the one whose name
is being used.
140
Doing so would not mean that teams such as the NFL's 49'ers
could not call themselves the San Francisco 49'ers should they
choose to relocate to Santa Clara. Instead, it simply recognizes the
reality that the team receives some benefit from the association with
San Francisco and provides the city with the opportunity to be fairly
compensated for the benefits that run to the team as a result of its use
of the city's name. In sum, the creation of this limited right of
publicity creates a market for a city's name in which its value can be
fairly and equitably determined through the bargaining process. Once
this is determined, the team would then have a choice: pay a fee to the
city for the use of its name or forego the association. For the first
time, cities would be able to adequately protect the interest of their
citizens when negotiating lease provisions with professional sports
teams. This may be the only way for them to do so; without this right,
the monopoly power of professional sports leagues, as wielded
through the powerful tool of geographic exclusivity, puts cities at
their mercy.
Lawyers, economists, public officials and team owners may all
disagree about the value of a team's association with a particular city,
or even whether there is any value to this at all, but without this right,
all such debates are purely in the abstract. Not until the association is
offered up for negotiation does anybody truly know how much the
San Francisco association means to the 49'ers. Moreover, establishing
this limited property right may very well lead to widely different
results, depending on the particulars of each individual negotiation.
For example, in recent years, Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos
demonstrated a weak commitment to his team's association with the
city of Baltimore as he attempted to broaden the team's fan base
beyond the near suburbs and into Washington, D.C. and Northern
Virginia.14 1 To this end, he had the name "Baltimore" removed from
140 It is important to note that the legislation proposed within this article would be limited
in scope, addressing and redressing only identifiable harms. As such, it would not apply to every
commercial and public use of a geographic identifier and certainly not to uses such as "New
York" bagels or "Philadelphia Cream Cheese": uses that have not been shown to inflict harm
upon the cities used in connection with the product. This article has demonstrated that, within
the stadium name-game context, cities are damaged through misappropriation of their names for
the economic benefits of sports fi'anchise owners. As such, legislation limited to this
demonstrated harm would be warranted.141See Michael I. Krauss, From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball
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both his team's home and road uniforms. 142 One suspects that if he
were to consider in-market relocation beyond the Baltimore city limit,
he would not pay much, if anything, to maintain his team's Baltimore
association (although the subsequent relocation of the Montreal
Expos to Washington may have changed his thinking). On the other
side of the negotiating table, San Diego's mayor has publicly stated
that he would like the NFL's Chargers to retain their San Diego
affiliation even should they relocate from the city to another location
within San Diego County. 143 Under this scenario, it is likely that the
association would be offered up to the team for little or no cost.
(Given the lack of options presently available to the city, however, the
mayor's statement is not surprising; one suspects that he might place
more of a value on his city's name if the prospect of remuneration
was on the bargaining table.)
In situations where a team values the association and a city is
determined to protect it, however, the fee would be higher and would,
just as in the Baltimore and San Diego examples, reflect the perceived
value of the association. Returning to Arturo Moreno and his Angels,
although this limited right of publicity would not have directly
affected the city of Anaheim, it would nevertheless have played an
important role in the resolution of the issue. Very likely, the city of
Los Angeles-Moreno's desired geographic affiliation-would have
recognized the value of the affiliation to Moreno and offered it up for
a substantial fee. At that point Moreno would have been presented
with a choice: pay a high fee for the perceived value the Los Angeles
affiliation brings to his team or no fee to maintain the less valuable
Anaheim association. Such a choice would represent the realities of
in-market relocations or, in this unique example, in-market affiliation
relocations. Each party is compelled to weigh the costs and benefits
of such relocations and act accordingly. Through this process, the
rights of each party are properly expressed and protected.
CONCLUSION
Establishing a limited right of publicity, as outlined above,
effectively prevents the continuation of professional sports teams'
abuse of their monopoly power by pitting city against suburb in
stadium lease negotiations. This right recognizes the inherent value in
the affiliation of city and team and forces teams to acknowledge the
Stadium Financing-Washington D.C., 34 URB. LAW. 407,408 (2002).
142 Id.
143 See Vega, supra note 2.
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value they receive whenever they take the field in the name of these
cities. Should these teams find their current stadiums or lease
arrangements insufficient, negotiations would then occur on an even
playing field, with city, competing suburb, and professional sports
franchise all able and compelled to weigh the true costs and benefits
of potential in-market relocation. One-sided leases with below-market
rents and above-market perks would become less frequent in this
scenario given the value placed on the large market affiliation.
Perhaps a more affluent, more spacious suburb can offer land more
cheaply than its nearby city. Recognizing and commodifying the
value of the city affiliation enables cities to compete in this market by
means other than by offering financially imprudent lease terms which
thereby damage their taxpayers.
The true cost of in-market relocations would be recognized as
television networks would perhaps put pressure on teams to maintain
their large city affiliations through threats of financially reduced
broadcast packages should these affiliations disappear. Leagues as
well might, at some point, exert similar pressure in recognition of the
reality that their "big league" status depends in no small part on their
teams' affiliation with large cities rather than small, unknown
geographic locations. All of these forces would be at work whenever
a team enters negotiations with a city over the terms of a stadium
lease. For the first time, it would be the city and not the team that
would wield the hammer at the bargaining table, regardless of
professional sports' monopoly power and resultant geographic
exclusivity. Because of the increased bargaining power of cities,
stadium deals would more truly reflect the interests of the public than
ever before as they would properly consider the attendant costs and
benefits associated with a professional sports team's playing its
games in one particular geographic location rather than another.
What's in a name? For the first time, negotiators on both sides of the
bargaining table would find out definitively.
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